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Abstract 
 We investigate whether loan growth affects the riskiness of individual banks in 16 major 
countries. Using Bankscope data from more than 16,000 individual banks during 1997-2007, 
we test three hypotheses on the relation between abnormal loan growth and asset risk, bank 
profitability, and bank solvency. We find that loan growth leads to an increase in loan loss 
provisions during the subsequent three years, to a decrease in relative interest income, and to 
lower capital ratios. Further analyses show that loan growth also has a negative impact on the 
risk-adjusted interest income. These results suggest that loan growth represents an important 
driver of the riskiness of banks. 
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1. Introduction 
 The current financial crisis represents a drastic example of what can go wrong with 
respect to the interplay of growth and risk in bank lending. Specifically, the growth in 
subprime mortgage lending, fueled by low interest rates, booming housing markets, credit 
securitization, and lax credit standards, has led to unprecedented credit losses and serious 
consequences for the global economy, highlighting the importance of the growth-risk nexus in 
bank lending (e.g., Borio, 2008; Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven, 2008; Demyanyk and van 
Hemert, 2008; Gorton, 2008). 
 In this paper, we take a more general perspective and intend to provide new evidence on 
the intertemporal relation between loan growth and the riskiness of individual banks. Can 
individual banks grow without becoming riskier subsequently? Is loan growth associated with 
higher or lower risk-adjusted profitability? What is the relation between loan growth and bank 
capital? There is little evidence on these questions at the individual bank-level (e.g., Laeven 
and Majnoni, 2003; Berger and Udell, 2004). Beyond macroeconomic forces and structural 
trends that affect all banks in a similar way there are many important reasons why individual 
banks increase their lending. For instance, banks may intend to seize new lending 
opportunities, expand to new geographic markets or gain market share with existing products 
and markets. Moreover, potential mechanisms to increase lending are lowering interest rates 
or relaxing collateral requirements, loosening credit standards, or a combination of both (e.g., 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Ogura, 2006). In addition, some banks rely on internal 
growth but others follow an external growth strategy by means of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A). Under the presumption that new loans are granted to borrowers that were previously 
rejected, that were previously unknown or non-existent, or that ask for too low loan rates or 
too little collateral relative to their credit quality, loan growth may have adverse effects on 
bank risk. 
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 To address the questions raised above, we examine the link between loan growth and three 
fundamental dimensions: the default risk of the loan portfolio, the interest income from 
lending, and the capital structure. For each of the three dimensions we rely on different 
empirical measures to capture the credit risk associated with bank lending, the compensation 
for risk taking, and the overall fragility of banks. Based on Bankscope data from more than 
16,000 individual banks in 16 major countries during the period 1997-2007, we test three 
hypotheses on the relation between abnormal loan growth and riskiness of banks under 
regular conditions.1 Abnormal loan growth is defined as the difference between an individual 
bank’s loan growth and the median loan growth of banks from the same country and year. 
First, we investigate if and how past abnormal loan growth affects loan losses of individual 
banks. Given the experience that borrowers do not immediately default after they have 
received a bank loan (“loan seasoning”; e.g., Berger and Udell, 2004), we expect that loan 
growth translates into an increase of loan loss provisions with a time lag of several years 
(Hypothesis 1). Second, we examine how abnormal loan growth influences the profitability of 
individual banks. If new loans are granted at lower rates, the average outstanding loan volume 
generates a lower relative interest income (Hypothesis 2). Third, we analyze the impact of 
abnormal loan growth on bank solvency. If banks fund loan growth mainly with new debt, the 
capital structure becomes more risky. We expect that loan growth leads to a decrease of the 
equity-to-total assets ratio (Hypothesis 3). The multivariate analyses of these hypotheses 
indicate that past abnormal loan growth is significantly positively related to loan losses and 
significantly negatively associated with bank profitability and solvency. 
 Our paper contributes in several ways. Most of the related studies analyze the link 
between economic cycles, loan growth, and loan losses at the aggregate level, focusing on the 
macro-economic determinants of loan growth. Our paper goes beyond these studies by 
                                                 
1 Regular conditions refer to a stable economic and legal environment with banking regulation and moderate 
macroeconomic cycles which are present in all countries included in our sample. The only exception is Japan 
which we include because of the size of its financial system. All our results based on the full sample remain 
robust if we exclude Japan. 
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analyzing the effects of abnormal loan growth on the riskiness of individual banks, controlling 
for country- and year-specific macroeconomic conditions, including effects from monetary 
and fiscal policy. Moreover, we focus on the intertemporal relation between loan growth and 
bank risk while most of the related studies consider the contemporaneous relation in the 
context of procyclicality. We also provide a comprehensive view on the riskiness of banks, 
analyzing three fundamental dimensions: credit risk associated with lending, income from 
lending, and bank solvency. Finally, our study is based on a large and international micro 
dataset, including the most important banking systems as well as different types of banks, to 
obtain comprehensive and robust results. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the related 
literature and in Section 3 we describe the data. In Section 4 we report our main results and in 
Section 5 we present findings from further empirical checks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
 Although the intertemporal relation between loan growth and bank risk, especially credit 
losses, has been studied at the macroeconomic level in several strands of the literature (e.g., 
booms and busts in credit markets, banking crises, procyclicality of bank regulation; e.g., 
Borio, Furfine, and Lowe, 2001; Keeton, 1999), research is rather silent about the cross-
sectional differences in this link. 
 Early empirical studies based on U.S. micro data indicate that loan growth may lead to a 
subsequent increase of loan losses. Sinkey and Greenawalt (1991) analyze large U.S. banks 
during the period 1984-1987 and find that the average past loan growth is significantly 
positively related to the contemporaneous loan loss rate. Interestingly, there is substantial 
cross-sectional heterogeneity in this link that cannot be explained with macro-economic 
factors. Clair (1992) analyzes data on individual banks from Texas during the period 1976-
1990 and detects a negative impact of loan growth on nonperforming loans and the loan 
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charge-off rate for the first year after a bank’s credit expansion, whereas for subsequent years, 
a positive relation is partly found. Berger and Udell (2004) examine the procyclicality of bank 
lending in the U.S. during 1980-2000. They find that credit standards are relaxed and more 
loans are granted as time passes by since a bank’s last peak in loan losses. This result is 
evidence in favor of the “institutional memory hypothesis”, i.e., the ability of loan officers to 
recognize potential loan problems fades out over time, lowering the credit standards and 
increasing the lending volume. 
 The determinants of loan losses have also been studied at the international level and in 
countries outside the U.S. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) analyze Bankscope data from 45 
countries to shed light on factors influencing the loan loss provisioning and income smoothing 
of more than 1,000 large commercial banks during the period 1988-1999. It turns out that, on 
average, banks provision too little in good times of the cycle and are forced to overreact in 
bad times. They also detect a significantly negative contemporaneous relation between loan 
growth and loan losses, suggesting an imprudent provisioning behavior of banks. Similarly, 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) examine the contemporaneous relation between loan loss 
provisioning of individual commercial banks and the business cycle during the period 1991-
2001. Based on Bankscope data from a subset of OECD countries they find a negative 
relation between GDP growth and loan loss provisioning, i.e., a procyclical effect. This 
relation is partially mitigated by a positive contemporaneous link between loan loss 
provisioning and loan growth, which is in contrast to the findings from Laeven and Majnoni 
(2003). The key difference to our analysis is that the previous two studies do not investigate 
the intertemporal relation between loan growth and bank risk. 
 The latter issue has been addressed in the following studies. Salas and Saurina (2002) 
analyze a large data set from Spanish commercial and savings banks from the period 1985-
1997. They find that loan growth (branch growth) of savings banks is significantly positively 
associated with loan losses three (four) years ahead. Hess, Grimes and Holmes (2008) analyze 
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determinants of credit losses at 32 Australasian banks during the period 1980-2005. It turns 
out that strong loan growth translates into higher credit losses with a lag of two to four years, 
which is similar to our findings despite of a very different dataset. Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi 
(2007) as well as Illueca, Norden and Udell (2008) document that bank ownership is an 
important determinant of lending behavior, risk taking and performance. Therefore, we 
subsequently control for bank specialization and bank type (e.g., savings banks, private 
commercial banks), which coincides in some countries with bank ownership. Finally, there 
are studies that analyze the relation between loan growth and banking crises in transition 
economies and developing countries (e.g., see Cottarelli, Dell’Ariccia and Vladkova-Hollar, 
2005; Kraft and Jankov 2005) while we focus on regular conditions. 
 Summarizing, we extend the literature by focusing on the intertemporal, bank-specific 
linkages between loan growth and risk as well as by taking a multi-dimensional view on the 
riskiness of individual banks. 
 
3. The data 
 We analyze yearly balance sheet and income statement data from Bankscope on more than 
16,000 individual banks from 16 major countries during the period 1997-2007. Our sample 
includes banks from the U.S., Canada, Japan, and 13 European countries.2 The banking 
systems of these countries, as measured by total banking assets in 2002, are among the 21 
largest in the world, and we cover all of the 12 largest banking systems, as well as the 
important banking centers Luxembourg and Switzerland. Furthermore, the sum of the GDPs 
for 11 out of the 16 selected countries adds up to 94% of the cumulative GDP for the world’s 
15 largest economies in 2001. Analyzing a cross-section of the most important banking 
systems has the advantage to obtain comprehensive findings, which are robust to differences 
                                                 
2 These countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
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in credit supply and demand, bank competition, and bank regulation. Emerging Asian 
markets, developing countries, and transition economies are excluded from our sample 
because our goal is to analyze loan growth under regular conditions. Since our focus is on 
bank lending to the private sector, we exclude investment banks, development banks, and 
other similar institutions. Moreover, since we use historical releases of the Bankscope data 
base the raw data represents an unbalanced panel, with some banks entering the sample after 
1997 and others dropping out before 2007. Accounting standards are subject to changes over 
time, and in 451 cases, banks have switched from national to international financial reporting 
standards. To avoid structural breaks in our time series, the respective observation is dropped. 
Table 1 reports main characteristics of the data set. 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
Panel A displays the number of banks in our final data set and compares the sample 
composition to the total number of banks in each country published in OECD statistics. In 
most of the countries, a substantial fraction of the relevant banks in existence is covered by 
our data, amounting to an overall coverage of 67.7%. Note that the representativeness 
measured by the fraction of total assets covered is even higher because Bankscope claims to 
cover at least 90% of total banking assets per country. 
Panel B summarizes the main variables employed in the subsequent empirical analyses, 
referring to bank-year observations. We measure loan growth (LGi,t) as the percentage change 
in the amount of bank i’s total customer loans from the year t – 1 to year t. Lending to other 
financial institutions is not included as this is a distinct line of business, implying a different 
risk-return structure. The mean (median) annual loan growth amounts to 11.3% (7.4%). 
Notice that the data set includes some extreme observations from banks which reduced their 
lending to customers by 28% during one year as well as banks that expanded total customer 
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loans by 165%. We address the issue of extreme loan growth in Section 5.2 in more detail. 
The consequences of a bank’s loan growth are not only determined by its absolute level, but 
depend crucially on the relative growth rate compared to its competitors under similar 
conditions, in the same country and year. Therefore, our main analysis are based on the 
abnormal loan growth rate (ALGi,t), defined as the difference between bank i’s loan growth 
rate and the growth rate of each country’s aggregate loan amount, as reported in OECD and 
central bank statistics, in the year t: ALGi,t = LGi,t – Aggregate(LGc,t).3 This approach permits 
to control for the macroeconomic and competitive conditions in each country and year. 
 Loan losses (LLi,t) are measured as the fraction of loan loss provisions established in the 
year t relative to total customer loans in year t – 1 (e.g., Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). Since 
borrowers rarely default during the first year after a new loan has been granted, to disentangle 
losses of existing loans from contemporaneous changes in total lending, and because of 
potential endogeneity problems, we take lag 1 of total customer loans in the denominator and 
not the contemporaneous variable. We are aware of two problems related to this measure of 
relative loan losses: First, loan loss provisions which have been established in one year may 
be canceled in subsequent years if the borrower recovers from financial distress, which causes 
a netting effect. Our data does not allow us to control for this effect, i.e., loan losses are 
systematically underestimated, which creates a conservative bias in our analysis. Second, as 
the allocation to loan loss reserves reduces the amount of total customer loans in the balance 
sheet, there may be compensating effects with our measure of loan growth. However, we do 
not expect any material distortions to be caused by this because loan loss provisions are 
relatively small (median of 0.36%) compared to typical rates of loan growth (median of 
7.4%). Additionally, we use z-scores as a distance-to-default measure for banks as a 
robustness check in Section 5.1. 
                                                 
3 All of our results remain unchanged if we subtract the median loan growth rate of all banks in the same country 
and year, i.e., the aggregate lending volume to non-banks, as an alternative benchmark. 
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The relative interest income (RIIi,t) is defined as the fraction of total interest income 
over total customer loans. Given that the income statement reflects first-year earnings from 
lending on a prorated basis, the annual interest income from new loans is likely to be smaller 
than the annual interest income of loans in the second year and so forth because new loans are 
granted gradually throughout all calendar months, and thus do not pay interest for a full first 
year. Therefore, we use the average of total customer loans from year t – 1 and year t as the 
denominator of RIIi,t.4 The relative interest income, with a median of 9.11%, may be upward 
biased because of interest-related payments due to guarantees granted that are not part of total 
customer loans. For this reason, RII exhibits a maximum of 37.68%. 
Bankscope provides all items from bank balance sheets and income statements in U.S. 
Dollar denomination, where numbers in other currencies are already converted. However, as 
the local market is still dominant for most banks’ business, we reverse this conversion with 
the appropriate year-specific exchange rate and calculate loan growth rates, loan losses, and 
the relative interest income from numbers in local denomination. 
The equity-to-total assets ratio (EQASSETSi,t) represents the key measure of bank 
solvency, with values between 2.18% and 31.80% and a median of 8.58%. The equity ratio 
indicates a bank’s ability to cover any kind of unexpected losses (due to lending or other 
activities). Therefore, banks are required to meet a minimum regulatory capital ratio of 8% 
under the Basel I and Basel II capital adequacy rules.5 In fact, most of the banks hold a 
considerable capital buffer above the 8% ratio. We consider values for all variables below the 
1%-quantile and above the 99%-quantile to be outliers, and exclude these observations from 
all analyses. In the remainder, we control for bank size (using the total amount of customer 
loans) and differentiate by bank specialization: bank holdings and holding companies 
                                                 
4 We employ the total loan volume from year t-1 plus 50% of the volume of new loans granted during year t, 
implicitly assuming a uniform distribution of loan granting throughout the year. 
5 We use the accounting capital ratio as a proxy because Bankscope reports missing values for the regulatory 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios in many countries and years. 
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(S_BHHC; 1,493 banks in 1999), commercial banks (S_COMM; 7,451 banks), cooperative 
banks (S_COOP; 2,098 banks), medium and long term credit banks (S_MLTC; 26 banks), 
real estate and mortgage banks (S_REMB; 95 banks), and savings banks (S_SAV; 1,473 
banks). Finally, we apply a full set of interacted country-year dummies to capture the 
macroeconomic heterogeneity due to the cross-country composition of our data set. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Loan growth and loan losses 
 We now analyze the impact of past abnormal loan growth on contemporaneous loan 
losses. As stated in H1, we intend to test whether rapid loan growth in the past is associated 
with a gradual decrease of the average credit quality in a bank’s loan portfolio. Therefore, we 
regress contemporaneous loan losses (LLi,t, as defined above) on past abnormal loan growth 
(ALGi,t-k), as indicated in the following model: 
LOGLLi,t =  α + β1 LOGLLi,t-1 + ( )∑
= −+
4
1
1β
k
ktik ALG ,  + β6 SIZEi,t + β7 EQASSETSi,t 
   + γ specialization dummies + δ country-year-dummies + εi,t (1) 
 
 First, since almost all values of LLi,t are bigger than zero, we control for the lognormal 
distribution of loan losses by taking the natural logarithm of this variable (LOGLLi,t), to 
obtain a (-∞,+∞) range of possible values, and thus implicitly exclude net releases of loan loss 
reserves from our analysis (LLi,t ≤ 0; 2,564 observations). Since we regard these releases 
rather as a means of earnings management than as a valid proxy for of credit risk, we do not 
expect much information being lost by this restriction. As loan loss provisions highly depend 
on other determinants of credit risk besides loan growth, and are therefore related to past loan 
losses, we include the lagged dependent variable LOGLLi,t-1, which controls for a bank’s 
overall risk characteristics. The fact that most of the loan losses typically are not realized 
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before the second year after the loan has been granted leads us to include lag 1-4 of abnormal 
loan growth (ALGi,t-k) as explanatory variables (“loan seasoning”). If banks expand their total 
loan volume by granting credit to relatively low-quality borrowers, as implied in H1, we 
expect to find a positive relation between loan losses and higher lags of past loan growth. 
 As control variable for bank i’s size (SIZEi,t), we consider the logarithm of its total 
customer loans (LOGTCLi,t), and to control for the level of capitalization, the equity-to-total 
assets ratio (EQASSETSi,t) of the respective bank and year is included in our regressions. 
Furthermore, dummy variables for each bank type capture specialization effects. The 
macroeconomic conditions (economic growth, monetary policy, etc.) represent an important 
determinant of both loan supply and demand. However, as we focus on an individual bank’s 
decision to expand or reduce lending, we control for the macroeconomic conditions by 
including a full set of interacted indicator dummy variables for countries and years (16*11 = 
176 dummies). 
 We apply two different techniques to estimate the model: Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions and a dynamic two-step system GMM panel estimator, as proposed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction.6 Given our unbalanced 
panel and the autoregressive regression model, we prefer the orthogonal deviations 
transformation of instruments, which makes them also exogenous to possible bank-level fixed 
effects. Standard errors are robust regarding potential problems from heteroskedasticity and 
clustering of observations within banks using the Huber-White correction in the OLS 
specification, and using the Windmeijer correction in our GMM models.. 
 Table 2 displays the results from the baseline regressions. Model (1) is estimated using 
OLS, whereas columns (2) and (3) report the output from GMM estimates. In Model (2), we 
treat only the lagged dependent variable (LOGLLi,t-1) as endogenous, so that “GMM-style” 
                                                 
6 To be precise, the estimation method follows Roodman’s (2007) “xtabond2” command for Stata. 
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instruments of deeper lags are created,7 and in model (3), we extend this set of predetermined 
variables by lagged loan growth (LGi,t-k) and the ratio of equity over assets (EQASSETSi,t), 
which we hypothesize to depend on loan growth (H2). Two tests support our specification 
choice: The null of second-order autocorrelation (AR(2)) is rejected, and heteroskedasticity-
consistent Hansen J-tests confirm the validity of our instrument set at least at the 5%-level. 
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
 As Hypothesis H1 suggests, our results from models (1) and (2) document a substantial, 
positive, and highly significant impact of ALGt-2 and ALGt-3 on contemporaneous loan losses. 
The coefficient of ALGt-4 is also significantly positive, however, Wald tests for differences 
between coefficients confirm that ALGt-2 and ALGt-3 exhibit the strongest effect. The 
evidence provided by model (3) is less clear, but it still confirms a significantly positive 
coefficient for ALGt-3. Our results are consistent with Salas and Saurina (2002) who discover 
a positive impact of lag 3 of loan growth on total loan loss reserves at Spanish banks. 
However, since they measure loan losses differently, the magnitude of their results can not be 
directly compared to our findings. The coefficient for ALGt-3, which amounts to 
approximately 0.2 in models (1) and (2), means that an abnormal loan growth of 18.7% (one 
standard deviation) in year t-3 leads to a relative increase of the ratio of relative loan losses by 
3.8% (starting from the mean). The effect becomes stronger if we jointly consider the loan 
growth from all three previous years (instead of year t-3 only). Note that the negative 
influence of ALGt-1 is due to a technical effect since the total loan amount in t-1 is included in 
the numerator of ALGt-1 as well as in the denominator of LLt. We cannot detect a significant 
impact of bank size (measured by total customer loans) or the equity-to-total assets ratio on 
                                                 
7 We prefer the Blundell-Bond (1998) setting to adjusting a LSDV estimator for the autoregressive bias (Kiviet, 
1995, Bruno, 2005) to have a consistent framework for the estimation of models (2) and (3). 
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relative loan losses, and with respect to bank specialization, our expectation is confirmed that 
real estate and mortgage banks, which mainly grant secured loans with relatively low default 
risk (of course, except the subprime mortgage lending segment), exhibit substantially lower 
loan losses. This effect is smaller in absolute values, but still significantly negative to the 1%-
level, for cooperative and savings banks.8 
 There may be the concern that abnormal loan growth in the years t-k is serially correlated, 
leading to multicollinearity in the linear regression model. We address this problem in three 
different ways: First, past loan growth is treated as endogenous in model (3) of Table 2, 
meaning that “GMM-style” instruments are used, and we obtain – though less significantly – 
the same key findings. Second, we analyze two-way linkages between loan growth and loan 
losses using a Vector Autoregressive Model (Section 5.3, Table 8), and the positive link 
between loan growth and past loan losses is also confirmed. Third, we estimate models with 
polynomially distributed lags following Almon (1965). Assuming either a quadratic or a cubic 
functional form for the time lag between past loan growth on loan losses, both specifications 
show a significantly positive peak in coefficients for ALGt-2 and ALGt-3, so that our previous 
findings are confirmed as well. Summarizing, we find clear support for Hypothesis H1 
discovering a positive and highly significant relation between past abnormal loan growth and 
contemporaneous loan losses at the individual bank-level, meaning that new loans exhibit a 
higher risk of default. 
 
4.2. Loan growth and interest income 
 Subsequently, we examine whether new loans that have been granted in order to 
abnormally expand a bank’s credit portfolio are priced at a lower rate than loans granted by 
banks that intend to maintain their current credit exposure, as suggested by Hypothesis H2. 
                                                 
8 In Section 4.5 we run separate regression models by bank specialization and obtain similar findings on the 
influence of past abnormal loan growth on loan losses (except for savings banks). 
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Note that a risk-based loan pricing policy, combined with the positive relation between past 
loan growth and loan losses detected in Section 4.1, would require banks to charge higher 
rates for these additional loans compared to the existing credit portfolio.9 However, the 
competition for borrowers may induce banks to underprice the loan rates of competing banks 
in order to attract new customers (e.g., Ogura, 2006). 
 We use the following regression model to explain the change in relative gross interest 
income of each bank (ΔRIIi,t) by the contemporaneous abnormal loan growth (ALGi,t) and a 
set of control variables: 
 
ΔRIIi,t =  α + β1 ALGi,t + β2 SIZEi,t + β3 EQASSETSi,t + γ specialization dummies 
  + δ country-year-dummies + εi,t (2) 
 
 The relative interest income of bank i in the year t (RIIi,t as defined in Section 3) is highly 
correlated with RIIt-1 since income from all active loans that have been granted before t–1 are 
included in both variables. Therefore, it is crucial to take the first difference of this variable 
(ΔRIIi,t = RIIi,t – RIIi,t-1) to measure the incremental changes in relative interest income, the 
variable we are actually interested in. Note that ΔRIIi,t only measures the change in average 
interest income from the entire loan portfolio, i.e., it is impossible to extract the fraction of the 
interest income that stems from newly granted loans. The contemporaneous abnormal loan 
growth (ALGi,t) represents the main explanatory variable, and according to Hypothesis H2, 
we expect the relative interest income to decrease for rapidly growing banks, and thus a 
negative impact of ALGi,t on ΔRIIi,t. In contrast to the intertemporal relation between loan 
growth and loan losses analyzed in Section 4.2, we hypothesize that abnormal loan growth 
immediately translates into lower relative interest income, so that we do not have to consider 
lagged values of ALGi,t. Again, we control for bank i’s size (SIZEi,t) by including the natural 
                                                 
9 We investigate the relation between loan growth and the risk-adjusted relative interest income in Section 4.3. 
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logarithm of its total customer loans, and for its capitalization, we proxy with the equity-to-
total assets ratio (EQASSETSi,t). Since the relative interest income also depends on the 
macroeconomic conditions, especially the level and term structure of interest rates, we include 
a full set of interacted indicator dummy variables for countries and years as controls. 
Furthermore, to deal with bank-specific effects, dummy variables for each bank type are 
included in our baseline models (OLS regressions), and alternatively, and we use bank-level 
fixed effects to capture cross-sectional heterogeneity. All standard errors are robust regarding 
potential distortions from heteroskedasticity and clustering of observations within banks using 
the Huber-White correction. Table 3 displays the regression results. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
 We detect a negative and highly significant impact of ALGi,t on ΔRIIi,t, which represents 
evidence in favor of Hypothesis H2 claiming that loan growth leads to a reduction in the 
relative interest income. Interestingly, this link is non-linear and more pronounced if we omit 
extreme values of abnormal loan growth. While model (1) in Table 3 displays our OLS 
regression results for the full sample, the OLS model (2) and the fixed-effects model (3) 
exclude observations where loan growth is more than 35.6% higher than the median in the 
respective country and year (95%-quantile of the ALG distribution). For this subsample, 
coefficients of ALGi,t are three times larger than in the full sample specification, indicating 
that very high loan growth does not involve lower relative interest income. These high 
abnormal growth rates may result from external bank growth through mergers or acquisitions, 
an issue that we analyze in Section 5.2. Moreover, the economic significance of the link 
detected is high: Coefficients of approximately –1.5 in models (2) and (3) predict the relative 
interest income to decline by 0.28% if a bank implements a loan growth rate of 18.4% (one 
standard deviation) above the median. Among the controls, the significantly positive 
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coefficient for bank size in models (1) and (2) indicates that large banks exhibit a trend to 
increase loan rates compared to smaller banks, and the same is true for relatively low-
capitalized institutions. In summary, with the exception of very high loan growth rates, our 
analysis provides evidence in favor of Hypothesis H2, i.e., loan growth leads to a decrease in 
the relative interest income of banks. 
 
4.3. The impact of loan growth on the ratio of loan losses and interest rate margin 
 So far, we have analyzed the effects of loan growth on loan losses (Section 4.1) and 
interest income (Section 4.2) separately. We now continue the analysis with a joint test of 
Hypotheses H1 and H2. The main issue is to analyze if and how high growth rates relate to 
loan losses after controlling for a possibly higher net interest result. If this is not the case, loan 
growth does not compromise a bank’s solvency because risk-adjusted loan pricing and 
consequent loan monitoring ensure a “healthy” growth strategy. However, if loan growth is 
significantly and negatively related to measures of risk-adjusted income, we can conclude that 
banks are growing by accepting lower-quality borrowers, granting new loans at relatively low 
rates, or even both. Problems for bank solvency may be most severe in the last case. 
 We examine the loss-income ratio (LOSSINCi,t), defined as the ratio of absolute loan loss 
provisions over net interest income from previous years. This ratio allows for a joint test of 
the influence of loan growth on loan losses and interest income. More specifically, we 
consider two definitions of the ratio in Model (1) and (2) that differ by the time horizon over 
which the input variables are measured. In Model (1), LOSSINCi,t is based on the net interest 
income in the four preceding years and calculated as follows:  
 
( )∑=
=
4
1
,
ExpenseInterest  - IncomeInterest 
k
t-k
t
ti
LLLOSSINC .          (3) 
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 Alternatively, since previous findings indicate that loan growth leads to a peak in loan 
losses two or three years later, the denominator of the ratio used in Model (2) is calculated 
only over the years t-2 and t-3. The key explanatory variable is bank i’s abnormal loan growth 
(ALGi,t), measured over the same time horizon as the dependent variable (Model (1): four 
preceding years, Model (2): years t–2 and t–3). We are aware of the problem that due to the 
time lag between the numerator, denominator, and the measure of loan growth, effects may 
also partially be driven by changes in the funding structure or funding costs, although we do 
not see a systematic bias that could fundamentally drive our results. We control for individual 
bank size (SIZEi,t) using the natural logarithm of total customer loans, and for capitalization 
with the equity-to-total assets ratio (EQASSETSi,t). Additionally, we include indicator 
dummy variables for each bank specialization, and a full set of interacted country-year 
variables serves as macroeconomic control. Table 4 displays results from OLS regressions. 
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
 It is striking that in both specifications, average abnormal loan growth in the past (ALGi,t-
k) exhibits a highly significant and positive coefficient. These results suggest that higher loan 
growth leads to an increase of loan loss provisions per unit of net interest income. Thus, 
rapidly growing banks are not able to obtain a sufficient compensation for the additional risks 
taken. Control variables indicate that in general, larger banks exhibit a more favorable loss-
income ratio, which is also the case for Bank Holdings, Cooperatives, and Savings Banks. 
Note that including the net interest income in the denominator of the ratio has the advantage 
that a bank’s actual refinancing costs in each year are directly included. In other words, these 
additional tests provide support for the view that loan growth has a negative impact on the 
risk-adjusted interest income of banks (represented by the inverse of LOSSINCi,t), meaning 
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that higher loan losses resulting from high loan growth cannot be compensated by higher 
interest rate margins. 
 
4.4. Loan growth and bank solvency 
 Our previous analyses reveal that past loan growth leads to an increase of 
contemporaneous loan losses and to a decrease of the relative interest income. Both findings 
indicate that loan growth increases the riskiness of banks. We now investigate if loan growth 
leads to an overall decline in bank solvency, as stated in Hypothesis H3. Bank solvency is 
measured by means of the equity-to-total assets ratio for each bank-year observation. 
 Before turning to the analysis, some additional explanations are in order. Potentially, one 
may think that loan growth always implies a decline of the equity-to-total assets ratio (as 
stated in Hypothesis H3). However, the following example shows that this is not the case. 
Consider a bank with total loans of 1,000 and no other assets, which exhibits an equity-to-
total assets ratio of 10%, i.e., equity amounts to 100 and total debt is 900. Suppose that these 
loans yield, on average, an interest margin of 1%, net of funding costs, assuming no other 
earnings or expenses. Thus, during one year, total net earnings add up to 10, and if no 
dividends are paid (which is not unusual, for example, in case of savings banks) both liquid 
assets and equity rises to 110. This corresponds to an increase of the equity-to-total assets 
ratio from 10% to 10.89% (=110/1,010). However, this increase in equity allows the bank to 
extend lending by 10% to 1,100 (converting 10 units of liquid assets into loans and 90 
additional units of debt) by the end of the same year, maintaining the equity-to-total assets 
ratio at the 10%-level (=110/1,100), even if the additional loans do not pay interest in their 
first year. These alternatives clearly show that loan growth is not necessarily associated with a 
decrease of the equity-to-total assets ratio. Higher growth rates can be funded by banks with 
higher net interest margins, other income types (e.g., fee, commission and trading income), or 
 19
by means of recapitalizations. Therefore, loan growth does not necessarily lead to a decrease 
in capital ratios. 
 In the multivariate analysis, we regress changes in the equity-to-total assets ratio of each 
bank i in the year t (ΔEQASSETSi,t) on contemporaneous loan growth and several control 
variables using the following model: 
 
ΔEQASSETSi,t =  α + β1 ALGi,t + β2 SIZEi,t + γ specialization dummies 
  + δ country-year-dummies + εi,t (4) 
 
 We consider the first difference ΔEQASSETSi,t = EQASSETSi,t – EQASSETSi,t-1 since 
capital ratios in subsequent years are usually highly correlated, and we are only interested in 
the relation between changes in equity and loan growth. The main explanatory variable is the 
contemporaneous abnormal loan growth (ALGi,t). According to Hypothesis H3, 
ΔEQASSETSi,t is expected to be negative for banks exhibiting rapid loan growth since these 
banks may not be able to increase their capital proportionally. We also control for individual 
bank size (SIZEi,t) by including the natural logarithm of the amount of total customer loans, 
and for further bank- specific effects in Model (1) using indicator dummy variables for each 
bank specialization, and in Model (2) with bank-level fixed effects instead. As 
macroeconomic control serves a full set of interacted dummy variables for countries and 
years. Finally, standard errors are robust regarding heteroskedasticity and clustering of 
observations within banks using the Huber-White correction. Table 5 summarizes the 
regression results. 
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
 20
 Most important, we detect a negative impact of abnormal loan growth on ΔEQASSETSi,t, 
which is statistically significant at the 1%-level. In both model specifications, the coefficient 
exhibits a magnitude of approximately –2.2, meaning that an “abnormal” increase of lending 
by one standard deviation (18.4%) is associated with a decrease of the equity ratio by 0.40%. 
In summary, we find a statistically and economically significant negative relation between 
abnormal loan growth and bank capitalization, which represents evidence in favor of 
Hypothesis H3. 
 
4.5. Differentiation by region, bank specialization, size, and capitalization 
 All results presented above are based on the full sample of more than 16,000 banks from 
16 countries. However, the linkages may differ by country, region, size, specialization, and 
capitalization. Therefore, we now test the Hypotheses H1–H3 in more detail, using again the 
regression models (1) – (3). The qualitative results are summarized in Table 6 (detailed results 
are availabe from the authors on request). 
 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
 
 The differentiation by country and region reveals that H1 is confirmed in many large 
countries (France, Germany, Spain, USA) and counter-evidence is only found for Belgium. 
Differentiating by regions leads to even clearer results: H1 is confirmed in the most important 
banking systems of North America and Central Europe. Support for H2 and H3 is found in 6 
out of our 7 regions. With regard to bank size, our hypotheses are corroborated in all three 
size categories but they are most pronounced for smaller banks (details not reported here). 
One explanation is that larger banks benefit from a more sophisticated risk management that 
mitigates adverse effects from loan growth. In addition, there are no substantial differences 
across bank specialization. Finally, the hypotheses are also confirmed across terciles of bank 
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capitalization. The unreported estimation results indicate that the positive impact of past loan 
growth on relative loan losses (H1) is strongest for banks with a capitalization in the mid 
tercile while it is less pronounced (but still significant) for weak or strong banks. Moreover, 
findings on H2 and H3 are highest for strong banks. The latter are able to grow by setting 
relatively low loan spreads, taking advantage of their higher capital buffers that allow a 
temporary cutback in interest income. Furthermore, regulatory or economic restrictions may 
not allow weak banks a further decrease of their poor capitalization, thus the relation proposed 
in H3 is less significant. A further explanation is that strong banks may possess superior 
management skills to obtain a sufficient compensation for risk (e.g., loan pricing policy) or to 
avoid future loan losses (e.g., loan exposure and credit portfolio management). This reasoning 
implies that loan growth is especially dangerous for weak banks because their (low) capital 
buffer is also more sensitive to loan growth. Consequently, monitoring the loan growth of 
weak institutions may be valuable for banking supervisors and deposit insurers. 
 
5. Further empirical checks 
5.1 Loan growth and banks’ distance-to-default 
 Loan loss provisions, our primary measure of bank risk that we have analyzed so far, are a 
proxy for credit risk, which allows us to demonstrate the intertemporal relation between 
abnormal loan growth and future loan losses. However, a bank’s decision to expand the 
amount of loans granted may also affect other aspects of bank risk, which translate into lower 
solvency as well. Thus, we consider a well-established alternative measure of bank risk: the z-
score 
)( Dev. Std.
)(Mean 
ROA
ROAEQASSETSz +=  (Roy, 1952; Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt, 1993). This 
ratio represents the average capitalization (EQASSETS) + return on assets (ROA) during the 
five preceding years over the 5-year standard deviation of the return on assets and can be 
understood as a measure of bank stability, indicating the distance to default. Banks with a 
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lower z-score would be considered more risky. Regressing z-scores on average loan growth in 
the last 5 years (controlling for a bank’s size, capitalization, specialization, country and years) 
indicates a highly significant negative relation, confirming our previous findings that 
abnormally growing banks are more risky (H1) and less stable (H3), which is not 
compensated by higher profitability (ROA, H2). 
 
5.2. Internal versus external growth of banks 
 We now extend our previous analysis by considering the type of loan growth. On the one 
hand, a bank may increase the loan volume because of new lending opportunities such as new 
lending segments or geographic expansion (internal growth). On the other hand, the loan 
portfolio may increase as a consequence of a takeover or bank merger (external growth). 
Since the propositions in Hypotheses H1–H3 are implicitly based on the idea of internal 
growth, we now address potential distortions from the M&A activity in the banking industry. 
Unfortunately, our data does not include bank- and year-specific information on M&A 
transactions so that we are unable to directly control for this effect. Instead, we construct an 
indicator variable MERGEi,t that takes the value 1 if bank i’s total equity increases by more 
than 40.0%, which corresponds to the 95%-quantile of the equity growth rate distribution. 
Otherwise, the value of MERGEi,t is 0.10 After specific accounting operations, the equity of 
two merging companies is usually pooled and consolidated, so that an increase by more than 
40.0% within one year is very unlikely to result from either retained profits or a regular 
increase in capital (e.g., seasoned equity offering). 
 In the remainder, we repeat the tests of hypotheses H1-H3, but include the indicator 
variables MERGEi,t, which we interact with the respective value of abnormal loan growth. For 
                                                 
10 Alternatively, we define MERGE based on the 95%-quantile of loan growth and obtain similar results. We 
also considered a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a bank has extreme equity or loan growth in one year 
(otherwise 0) and sum up this variable over all years for each bank which allows us to distinguish between banks 
which were involved in M&A at least once or never. We then re-estimate regression models 1-3 to test H1-H3 
for the both sub-samples of banks. This approach leads to results similar to the reported ones. 
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lagged values of ALGi,t-k, we take the corresponding lagged merger dummy (MERGEi,t-k). 
Estimation results are displayed in Table 7. 
 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
 
 First, the analysis of the influence of past abnormal loan growth on contemporaneous loan 
losses leads to interesting results (Panel A). The interaction term ALGi,t-1 X MERGEi,t-1 
exhibits a significantly negative and large coefficient. Consequently, M&A activity is 
predicted to lead to lower loan losses in the short run. The impact of the other lagged 
interaction terms is less surprising: Coefficients are negative, and summed up with the 
(positive) coefficients of ALGi,t-1, ALGi,t-2,…, the net influence of past external loan growth 
through M&A activity is significantly weaker than that in the case of internal growth. The 
overall coefficients of loan growth are –0.262 for the first lag, 0.096 for the second, 0.075 for 
the third, and –0.007 for the fourth. Accordingly, there still exists a moderate positive impact 
which, as we expected, is relatively weak for banks that grow through M&A. In other words, 
our previous findings on H1 are not biased by M&A transactions in the banking industry. 
 Second, as stated by H2, the impact of contemporaneous loan growth on relative gross 
interest income (ΔRIIi,t) is analyzed in Panel B. Similar to Panel A, we find a strong 
compensating effect between ALGi,t (significantly negative) and ALGi,t X MERGEi,t 
(significantly positive), resulting in a net coefficient of 1.11. In contrast to the results 
described in Section 4.2, we now observe a positive impact of loan growth through M&A on 
relative interest income, meaning that acquired banks exhibit, on average, higher loan rates 
than acquirers. This effect is likely to drive our finding from Section 4.2 that extremely high 
loan growth (above the 95%-quantile) is not associated with lower relative interest income. 
 Third, Panel C reports the corresponding results for the impact of loan growth on bank 
solvency as stated in Hypothesis H3. We also find a compensating effect between ALGi,t and 
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ALGi,t X MERGEi,t with a net coefficient of 1.06, meaning there is a small, positive impact of 
external loan growth on bank solvency.11 We would expect this finding for the case that a 
bank acquires / merges with an even better capitalized institution, resulting in a higher 
increase of equity relative to total loans and total assets.  
 In light of these results, we conclude that all of the relations uncovered in previous 
analyses are downward biased because of banks with high external growth rates. These persist 
even when we control for external growth in the manner described above. However, banks 
relying on external growth strategies through M&A experience by far weaker detrimental 
consequences regarding loan losses, income and solvency. Most importantly, if we exclude 
banks involved in M&A activities, our results for H1-H3 become even stronger. 
 
5.3. Two-way linkages between loan growth and loan losses 
 So far we have examined the one-way relation between past loan growth and 
contemporaneous loan losses. Subsequently, we study whether our findings remain robust if 
we explicitly consider intertemporal two-way linkages between loan growth and loan losses. 
On the one hand, we have shown that loan growth is associated with an increase in future loan 
losses. On the other hand, banks facing big loan losses may be forced to reduce future loan 
growth for several reasons (shareholder activism, reputation, accounting policies, risk of bank 
runs, banking regulation, etc.). For example, Keeton (1999) analyzes aggregate time-series of 
loan growth and loan losses for the U.S. and finds that there are important two-way linkages. 
In addition, Berger and Udell (2004) also examine the relation between peaks in loan losses, 
credit standards and loan growth.  
 Specifically, we estimate a modified two-equation vector autoregressive model (VAR) 
with changes in contemporaneous loan loss provisions and abnormal loan growth as 
                                                 
11 Indirectly, the tests of our three hypotheses suggest that acquirers benefit from synergies since the target banks 
tend to be less risky, more profitable and better capitalized in relative terms. Although “distress mergers” 
represent an alternative M&A motive, especially a preemptive mergers between smaller and unlisted banks, we 
do not find systematic evidence on this in our sample. 
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endogenous variables. The right-hand side variables (identical in both equations) are the 
cumulative relative loan losses over the period t-4 to t-1, the cumulative abnormal loan 
growth from t-4 to t-1, a bank size proxy, bank specialization dummies, and a full set of 
interacted country-year dummies.12 Table 8 reports the results. 
 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
 
 First and most important, our previous findings on the relation between loan growth and 
future loan losses (Hypothesis H1) remain robust if we include lags of loan losses. Second, 
lagged loan losses have indeed a significantly negative impact on contemporaneous loan 
growth. As discussed above, an increase in loan losses may force a bank to reduce loan 
growth in the future. Third, it turns out that contemporaneous loan losses can be better 
explained than contemporaneous loan growth in terms of goodness of fit (R2). In other words, 
the impact of loan growth on future loan losses, as stated in Hypothesis H1 and analyzed in 
Section 4.1, is stronger than the inverse relation, underlining the economic relevance of the 
hypothesis. Finally, as expected, both loan growth and loan losses exhibit positive serial 
correlation. Summarizing, previous results are confirmed although we find two-linkages 
(which is consistent with results from studies analyzing aggregate data) between loan growth 
and loan losses. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 This study provides new comprehensive evidence on the intertemporal relation between 
abnormal loan growth and the riskiness of individual banks. Using Bankscope data on more 
                                                 
12 We have also estimated a VAR model including lags 1, 2, 3, and 4 of loan growth and loan losses and obtain 
very similar results. However, relative loan loss provisions exhibit strong serial correlation which leads to a 
multicollinearity problem. As a solution, we consider cumulative variables. Cumulative loan growth is calculated 
as the product of the annual growth factors minus one (geometric growth) while cumulative relative loan loss 
provisions are calculated as the sum of the annual loan loss provisions.  
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than 16,000 individual banks from 16 major countries during 1997-2007, we test three 
hypotheses on the relation between past abnormal loan growth and loan losses, bank 
profitability, and bank solvency, controling for year- and country-specific effects. 
 First, with respect to H1 we find that past abnormal loan growth has a positive and highly 
significant influence on subsequent loan losses with a lag of two to four years. This evidence 
is based on a large cross-country sample of individual banks and consistent with findings on 
the aggregate link between loan growth and loan losses in single countries. Second, with 
respect to H2, we detect that abnormal loan growth leads to a decline in the relative interest 
income of banks. This finding holds for most countries and supports the view that new loans 
are granted at rates that do not compensate for the associated default risk. Third, the test of H3 
reveals that abnormal loan growth is significantly negatively related to bank solvency. In 14 
out of 16 countries, higher abnormal loan growth leads to lower capital ratios, indicating a 
decrease of bank solvency. 
 In further analyses, we provide evidence that our baseline results are considerably stronger 
if we exclude bank-year observations that are influenced by M&A activities. Simultaneous 
tests of H1 and H2 yield that loan growth leads to a deterioration in a bank’s risk-return 
structure. Although we find intertemporal two-way linkages between abnormal loan growth 
and losses, the positive relation between past abnormal loan growth and contemporaneous 
losses remains robust and turns out to be economically more important than the inverse 
relation. In additional tests of robustness, we have considered gross loan growth instead of 
abnormal loan growth and obtain highly similar results. 
 This paper has several important implications. Banks should carefully check whether the 
additional income generated by an increase in lending represents an adequate compensation 
for the additional risk taking. Bank supervisors and deposit insurers may benefit from 
monitoring a set of indvidual bank loan growth indicators to obtain early warning signals 
about the riskiness of banks. Further research may extend our study in analyzing the effects of 
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bank growth on bank risk, distinguishing between on-balance sheet activities (interest 
income) and off-balance sheet activities (non-interest income). Moreover, it would be 
interesting to study whether banks’ credit ratings and market-based credit risk indicators 
derived from stock prices, bond spreads, and credit default swap spreads of large banks (e.g., 
Bongini, Laeven and Majnoni, 2002; Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes, 2006; Lown and Morgan, 
2006) are complementary to accounting-based, dynamic bank activity measures like loan 
growth. Finally, in light of the current financial crisis the intertemporal relation between loan 
growth, risk taking and credit risk transfer activities of banks such as credit securitization and 
credit derivatives need to be investigated in more detail. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
Panel A: Bankscope and OECD statistics (1999) 
 
Country No. of banks 
in data set 
No. of banks 
(OECD) 
Fraction of banks 
covered in data set 
Belgium 39 75 52.00% 
Canada 38 53 71.70% 
Denmark 78 97 80.41% 
France 261 521 50.10% 
Germany 1,745 2,816 61.97% 
Italy 550 876 62.79% 
Japan 618 2,559* 24.15% 
Luxembourg 38 213 17.84% 
Netherlands 25 84 29.76% 
Norway 26 152 17.11% 
Portugal 24 203 11.82% 
Spain 92 290 31.72% 
Sweden 22 124 17.74% 
Switzerland 137 334 41.02% 
United Kingdom 100 420 23.81% 
United States 8,843 9,855 89.73% 
Total 12,636 18,672 67.67% 
*Data from the year 2001 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of main variables 
 
Variable Notation No. of obs Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
Relative loan losses (in %) LL 80,493 0.552 0.364 0.654 -0.583 5.987
Loan growth (%) LG 80,493 11.333 7.447 18.917 -27.619 164.810
Abnormal loan growth (%) ALG 80,493 4.383 0.773 18.697 -49.817 162.037
Relative interest income (in %) RII 80,493 9.663 9.140 3.417 2.952 37.680
Equity-to-total assets (in %) EQASSETS 101,153 9.106 8.583 3.836 2.177 31.798
Total assets (in bill. USD) TA 101,153 5.990 0.241 59.310 0.002 3,785.291
Total customer Loans (in bill. USD) SIZE 101,153 3.167 0.155 27.602 0.000 1,664.458
 32
Table 2 
Regression results for loan loss provisions 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of loan losses in t (LOGLLt), defined as the fraction 
of total loan loss provisions in year t over the total amount of customer loans in t-1. Explanatory variables are, 
besides the lagged dependent variable (LOGLLt-1), the lags 1-4 of abnormal loan growth (ALGt-k) as a decimal 
number. We control for bank-specific effects using the logarithm of total customer loans (SIZEi,t), the equity-to-
total assets ratio (EQASSETSi,t), and indicator dummy variables for each bank specialization: Commercial banks 
form the reference group, whereas Bank Holdings and Holding Companies are denoted by S_BHHC=1, 
Cooperative Banks by S_COOP=1, Medium and Long Term Credit Banks by S_MLTC=1, Real Estate / 
Mortgage Banks by S_REMB=1 and Savings Banks by S_SAV=1. We indirectly control for macroeconomic 
conditions by including a full set of interacted indicator dummy variables for countries and years. Model (1) is 
estimated using OLS, whereas columns (2) and (3) report coefficients stemming from a dynamic two-step 
system GMM panel estimator as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample 
correction. In model (2), we treat only the lagged dependent variable (LOGLLi,t-1) as endogenous, so that 
“GMM-style” instruments of deeper lags are created, and in model (3), we extend this set of predetermined 
variables by lagged loan growth (LGi,t-k) and the ratio of equity over assets (EQASSETSi,t). All p-values are 
calculated from Huber-White robust standard errors, controlling for clustering at individual banks. ***, **, * 
indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level. 
 
Dep. Var.: LOGLLi,t  (1) (2) (3) 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val. Coeff.  p-val. Coeff.  p-val.
LOGLLi,t-1  0.5952689*** 0.000 0.3154541 *** 0.000 0.3730345*** 0.000
ALGi,t-1  -0.0661250* 0.099 -0.0187893 0.639 0.0016438  0.987
ALGi,t-2  0.1334442 *** 0.000 0.1599735*** 0.000 0.1694745** 0.050
ALGi,t-3  0.1718842*** 0.000 0.2212582 *** 0.000 0.1413185** 0.021
ALGi,t-4  0.0831182*** 0.005 0.1299775*** 0.000 0.0097224 0.844
SIZEi,t  -0.0030756 0.501 0.0017987 0.767 0.0079307 0.312
EQASSETSi,t  -0.0005725 0.813 -0.0012716 0.682 0.0135304 0.426
S_BHHCi  -0.0110288 0.509 -0.0154458 0.469 -0.0203468 0.396
S_COOPi  -0.1634589*** 0.000 -0.2809620*** 0.000 -0.2617862*** 0.000
S_MLTCi  -0.2203780 0.175 -0.3501081 0.135 -0.3891607* 0.072
S_REMBi  -0.6222215*** 0.000 -1.081469*** 0.000 -0.9792085*** 0.000
S_SAVi  -0.1357489*** 0.000 -0.2760103 *** 0.000 -0.2527641*** 0.000
+ interacted country-year 
   dummy variables 
 yes yes yes  
Constant  -0.3015454*** 0.000 -0.5611711 *** 0.000 -0.6625528*** 0.001
No. of observations  21,540   21,540 21,540  
No. of banks  9,136   9,136 9,136  
Adjusted R²  0.519     
Test for AR(1): Prob > z    0.000 0.000  
Test for AR(2): Prob > z    0.093 0.103  
Hansen test: Prob > χ2    0.093 0.057  
Endogenous variables 
(“GMM-style” instruments) 
   LOGLLi,t-1 LOGLLi,t-1 
ALGi,t-k
EQASSETSi,t
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Table 3 
Regression results for the relative gross interest income 
The dependent variable is the absolute change from the year t-1 to t of bank i’s relative gross interest income 
(RIIi,t), defined as the fraction of total interest income in t over the average of total customer loans in t-1 and t). 
Explanatory variables are the contemporaneous abnormal loan growth (ALGi,t) as a decimal number, the 
logarithm of total customer loans (SIZEi,t), and the equity-to-total assets ratio (EQASSETSi,t). We control for 
further bank-specific effects using indicator dummy variables for each bank specialization: Commercial banks 
form the reference group, whereas Bank Holdings and Holding Companies are denoted by S_BHHC=1, 
Cooperative Banks by S_COOP=1, Medium and Long Term Credit Banks by S_MLTC=1, Real Estate and 
Mortgage Banks by S_REMB=1, and Savings Banks by S_SAV=1. In model (3), these dummies are replaced by 
bank-level fixed effects. We indirectly control for macroeconomic conditions by including a full set of interacted 
indicator dummy variables for countries and years. P-values are calculated from Huber-White robust standard 
errors, controlling for clustering at individual banks. ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level. 
 
Dep. Var.: ΔRIIi,t  (1) (2)  (3) 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val.
ALGi,t  -0.5237363*** 0.000 -1.521392*** 0.000  -1.453826*** 0.000
SIZEi,t  0.0211182*** 0.000 0.0175967*** 0.000  -0.0756320 0.122
EQASSETSi,t  -0.0196846*** 0.000 -0.0250655*** 0.000  -0.0661148*** 0.000
S_BHHCi  -0.0364131*** 0.002 -0.0235081** 0.044   
S_COOPi  0.1444130*** 0.000 0.0881359*** 0.000   
S_MLTCi  0.6012450*** 0.000 0.5699348*** 0.000   
S_REMBi  0.3394505*** 0.000 0.3322081*** 0.000   
S_SAVi  0.0914218*** 0.000 0.0832776*** 0.000   
+ bank-level fixed effects     yes 
+ interacted country-year 
   dummy variables 
 yes yes  yes 
Constant  -1.507643*** 0.000 -1.400089*** 0.000  -0.2287340 0.417
No of observations  62,098 59,646  59,646 
No of banks  14,726 14,574  14,574 
Adj. R² (fixed effects: within)  0.356 0.397  0.426 
Subsample  full sample ALGi,t < 35.6%  ALGi,t < 35.6% 
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Table 4 
Regression results for the ratio of loan losses and the net interest income 
The dependent variable (LOSSINCi,t) is the ratio of contemporaneous loan losses and the average net interest 
income in the past. Model (1) considers all four years t-1, t-2, t-3, and t-4, whereas model (2) focuses on the 
years t-2 and t-3. Explanatory variables are the average abnormal loan growth rate (Avg(ALGi)) as a decimal 
number, calculated over the corresponding time period, the logarithm of total customer loans (SIZEi,t), and the 
equity-to-total assets ratio (EQASSETSi,t). We control for further bank-specific effects using indicator dummy 
variables for each bank specialization: Commercial banks form the reference group, whereas Bank Holdings and 
Holding Companies are denoted by S_BHHC=1, Cooperative Banks by S_COOP=1, Medium and Long Term 
Credit Banks by S_MLTC=1, Real Estate and Mortgage Banks by S_REMB=1, and Savings Banks by 
S_SAV=1. We indirectly control for macroeconomic conditions by including a full set of interacted indicator 
dummy variables for countries and years. P-values are calculated from Huber-White robust standard errors, 
controlling for clustering at individual banks. ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level. 
 
Dep. Var.: LOSSINCi,t 
 (calculation period)
(1) 
(t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4) 
(2)  
(t-2, t-3) 
Explanatory Var. Coeff.  p-val. Coeff. p-val.
Avg(ALGi) in t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4 0.1018744*** 0.000  
Avg(ALGt) in t-2, t-3  0.0542047*** 0.000
SIZEi,t -0.0500236*** 0.000 -0.0567978*** 0.000
EQASSETSi,t 0.0016170** 0.042 0.0012598 0.126
S_BHHCi -0.0124467*** 0.000 -0.0107236*** 0.000
S_COOPi  -0.0143548* 0.062 -0.0121054* 0.082
S_MLTCi 0.0033628 0.874 0.0037775 0.867
S_REMBi -0.0011019 0.913 -0.0036536 0.734
S_SAVi -0.0257023*** 0.000 -0.0289053*** 0.000
+ interacted country-year 
   dummy variables 
yes yes 
Constant 0.3805318*** 0.000 0.4368883*** 0.000
No of observations 22,559 33,642 
No of banks 9,384 11,063 
Adj. R² 0.170 0.152 
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Table 5 
Regression results for the equity-to-total assets ratio 
The dependent variable is the absolute change from t-1 to t of bank i’s equity-to-total assets ratio 
(ΔEQASSETSi,t). Explanatory variables are the contemporaneous abnormal loan growth (ALGi,t) as a decimal 
number and the logarithm of total customer loans (SIZEi,t). We control for further bank-specific effects using 
indicator dummy variables for each bank specialization: Commercial banks form the reference group, whereas 
Bank Holdings and Holding Companies are denoted by S_BHHC=1, Cooperative Banks by S_COOP=1, 
Medium and Long Term Credit Banks by S_MLTC=1, Real Estate and Mortgage Banks by S_REMB=1, and 
Savings Banks by S_SAV=1. In model (2), these dummy variables are replaced by bank-level fixed effects. We 
indirectly control for macroeconomic conditions by including a full set of interacted indicator dummy variables 
for countries and years. P-values are calculated from Huber-White robust standard errors, controlling for 
clustering at individual banks. ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 
10%-level. 
 
Dep. Var.: ΔEQASSETSi,t (1) (2) 
Explanatory Var. Coeff.  p-val. Coeff. p-val.
ALGi,t -2.213505*** 0.000 -2.149049*** 0.000
SIZEi,t 0.0744316*** 0.000 0.6866952*** 0.000
S_BHHC -0.0914360*** 0.000  
S_COOP 0.1504493*** 0.000  
S_MLTC -0.1187245 0.361  
S_REMB -0.2561712*** 0.000  
S_SAV 0.0073623 0.680  
+ bank-level fixed effects  yes 
+ interacted country-year 
   dummy variables 
yes yes 
Constant -0.0654916*** 0.004 -3.577146*** 0.000
No of observations 78,912 78,800 
No of banks 16,245 16,247 
Adj. R² (fixed effects: within) 0.100 0.080 
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Table 6 
Summary of results by country, region, bank size, specialization, and capitalization 
This table differentiates the results for hypotheses H1-H3 by country, region, bank size, specialization, and 
capitalization. For each of the subsamples, the baseline regression models are used to check whether the findings 
for hypotheses H1-H3 prove true. + stands for a confirmation of the hypothesis (at least at the 5%-level), ~ 
indicates ambiguous evidence (the null cannot be rejected), and – means that contrarian evidence is found.  
 
Classification category H1 H2 H3 
Countries 
   Belgium 
   Canada 
   Denmark 
   France 
   Germany 
   Italy 
   Japan 
   Luxembourg 
   Netherlands 
   Norway 
   Portugal 
   Spain 
   Sweden 
   Switzerland 
   United Kingdom 
   USA 
 
Regions 
   Northern America (Canada, USA) 
   United Kingdom 
   Japan 
   Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 
   Germany and Switzerland 
   Northern Europe (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) 
   Southern Europe (Italy, Portugal, Spain,) 
 
 
– 
~ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
~ 
~ 
+ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
+ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
+ 
 
 
+ 
~ 
~ 
+ 
+ 
~ 
~ 
 
~ 
~ 
+ 
~ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
+ 
+ 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
~ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
~ 
~ 
+ 
+ 
~ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
 
+ 
+ 
~ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Bank size (75-95-100% quantile of total customer loans) 
   Small banks 
   Medium banks 
   Large banks 
 
 
+ 
~ 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
~ 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Bank specialization 
   Bank Holding and Holding Company 
   Commercial bank 
   Cooperative bank 
   Medium and Long Term Credit Bank 
   Real Estate / Mortgage Bank 
   Savings Bank 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
Bank capitalization (terciles) 
   Low (weak banks) 
   Medium 
   High (strong banks) 
 
+ 
+ 
~ 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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Table 7 
Interaction effects from mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry 
This table reports results for hypotheses H1-H3 taking into account the mergers and acquisitions activity of 
banks. M&A effects are considered by an interacted indicator variable MERGEi,t (= 1 if a bank’s total equity 
increases by more than 40.0%, which corresponds to the 95% percentile of the equity growth rate distribution). 
All regressions also include dummy variables for bank specializations and interacted countries/years (not 
reported here). P-values are calculated from Huber-White robust standard errors, controlling for clustering at 
individual banks. ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%; 5%, and 10%-level. 
 
Panel A: Loan growth and loan losses (H1) 
Dep. Var. LOGLLi,t 
Explanatory Var. Coeff.  p-val.
LOGLLi,t-1 0.5954992*** 0.000
ALGi,t-1 0.1000962* 0.074
ALGi,t-1 X MERGEi,t-4 -0.3621817*** 0.000
ALGi,t-2 0.1029457* 0.070
ALGi,t-2 X MERGEi,t-4 -0.0067092 0.923
ALGi,t-3 0.2791565*** 0.000
ALGi,t-3 X MERGEi,t-4 -0.2037789*** 0.001
ALGi,t-4 0.1192328*** 0.003
ALGi,t-4 X MERGEi,t-4 -0.1262412** 0.027
SIZEi,t -0.0024234 0.603
EQASSETSi,t 0.0011460 0.645
+ specialization dummy variables yes 
+ interacted country-year dummies Yes 
Constant -0.3221741*** 0.000
No. of observations 21,230   
No. of banks 8,959   
Adj. R² 0.519   
 
Panel B: Loan growth and interest income (H2) 
Dep. Var. ΔRIIi,t 
Explanatory Var. Coeff.  p-val.
ALGi,t-1 -1.715719*** 0.000
ALGi,t-1 X MERGEi,t-4 2.826737*** 0.000
SIZEi,t 0.0155375*** 0.000
EQASSETSi,t -0.0272306*** 0.000
+ specialization dummy variables yes 
+ interacted country-year dummies yes 
Constant -1.403906*** 0.000
No. of observations 62,097   
No. of banks 14,726   
Adj. R² 0.387   
 
Panel C: Loan growth and bank solvency (H3) 
Dep. Var. ΔEQASSETSi,t 
Explanatory Var. Coeff.  p-val.
ALGi,t-1 -4.289703*** 0.000
ALGi,t-1 X MERGEi,t-4 5.340658*** 0.000
SIZEi,t 0.0619825*** 0.000
+ specialization dummy variables yes 
+ interacted country-year dummies yes 
Constant -0.0063448 0.765
No. of observations 78,911   
No. of banks 16,245   
Adj. R² 0.220   
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Table 8 
Modified VAR model for loan losses and loan growth 
The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of bank i’s relative loan losses in t (LOGLLi,t), defined as the 
fraction of total loan loss provisions in t over the total amount of customer loans in t-1, and the abnormal loan 
growth in t. Explanatory variables are the cumulative abnormal loan growth (CUM_ALGi,t-1) as a decimal 
number in t-1 and the natural logarithm of cumulative loan losses (CUM_LOGLLi,t-1) in t-1. Cumulative 
variables span the years from t-1 to t-4. We control for bank size (SIZEi,t) using the logarithm of total customer 
loans, for capitalization with the equity-to-total assets ratio (EQASSETSi,t), and apply indicator dummy variables 
for each bank specialization: Commercial banks form the reference group, whereas Bank Holdings and Holding 
Companies are denoted by S_BHHC=1, Cooperative Banks by S_COOP=1, Medium and Long Term Credit 
Banks by S_MLTC=1, Real Estate / Mortgage Banks by S_REMB=1, and Savings Banks by S_SAV=1. We also 
include a full set of interacted country and year dummies. P-values are calculated from Huber-White robust 
standard errors, controlling for clustering at individual banks. ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level. 
 
  (1)  (2) 
Dep. Var.:  LOGLLi,t  ALGi,t 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
CUM_ALGi,t-1  0.0213848** 0.040  0.0530052*** 0.000 
CUM_LOGLLi,t-1  0.6521295*** 0.000  -0.0058643*** 0.000 
SIZEi,t  -0.0027188 0.608  0.0136059*** 0.000 
EQASSETSi,t  0.0015306 0.568  -0.0014489*** 0.001 
S_BHHCi  -0.0177748 0.378  -0.0070190** 0.028 
S_COOPi  -0.1574264*** 0.000  0.0187918*** 0.000 
S_MLTCi  -0.2474698 0.200  -0.0502684 ** 0.034 
S_REMBi  -0.4770529*** 0.000  -0.0402637*** 0.000 
S_SAVi  -0.0931875*** 0.000  -0.0079062* 0.051 
+ interacted country- 
    year dummies 
 yes  yes  
Constant  -1.128564*** 0.000  -0.0789364*** 0.000 
No. of observations  21,794    22,443  
No. of banks  9,223    9,343  
Adj. R²  0.477    0.137  
 
 
